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STATEMENT OF PACTS 
Appellant ROBERT HARRISON, JR. was charged with second-degree kidnapping of 
ten-year-ol and the jury was so instructed. (Record Vol. 11, p.284.) The district 
court denied defense's Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal at the close of the State's case 
but gave the jury an advisory instruction to acquit I-larrison of second degree kidnapping due to 
the lack of evidence of intent to conceal the child from his parents, and the court further 
instructed the jury on the included offense of enticing of children. (Record Vol. 11, pp.285, 
287.); (Tr.p.703,L.10-p.709,L.11.) 
estified to the following: Harrison drove by, opened his car door and said, 
"Hi." (Tr. p.279, L.3 - 10.) Harrison was insisting tha get in, saying, "Come on, come on, 
get in." (Tr. p.281, L.4 - 6.) When got in the truck he said, "That way," and pointed. 
Harrison tol he was going to drop something off at his house first. (Tr. p.282, L.5 - 25.) 
When they arrived at Harrison's apartment, he stopped the car and aslce if he wanted to 
go in. (Tr. p.285, L . l l  - 15.) I-Iarrison said he needed to put something in the refrigerator and 
asked f he wanted to watch a movie called "Star Trek," to which eplied, "No." 
(Tr. p.286, L.2 - 19.) 
then opened the door and got out of the truclc. Harrison told  "Be good." 
closed the truck door and walked away. When was haifway to the street he turned 
around and walked back to the truclc and asked Harrison his name through the open truck 
window. Harrison replied, "Junior." (Tr. p.287, L.3 - p.288, L.4.) 
According to  Harrison never touched him, never locked the doors, never 
threatened him, and never bloclted his egress from the truclc. (Tr. p.373, L.6 - 13.) Harrison 
never testified at trial. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 1 
During the argument on the jury instructions, defense argued that Instruction 19 (Record 
Vol. 11, p. 287.) on enticing of children should include an intent element requiring proof "that the 
child shall be concealed from public view." (Tr. p.692, L.20 - p.700, L.5.) Defense's motion was 
denied. 
The jury acquitted Harrison of second-degree kidnapping but convicted him of enticing 
of children. (Record p.293.) Post-trial, the district court denied Harrison's Rule 29(c) Motiou 
and Motion for New Trial. (Record pp.301, 303.) 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT ENTICING A CHILD UNDER 16 TO ENTER A 
VEHICLE MUST BE DONE WITH THE INTENT THAT THE CHILD SHALL BE 
CONCEALED FROM PUBLIC VIEW 
A. Intent to Conceal a Child Under 16 From Public View is an Element of I.C. $18- 
The district court instructed the jury on the included offense of enticement of children. 
Harrison requested the district court instruct the jury on the included element of "intent that the 
child be concealed from public view." The district court rejected this request and Harrison 
contends this is reversible error. 
I.C. 9 18-1509. Enticing of children states: 
(1) A person shall be guilty of. a misdemeanor if that person 
attempts to persuade, or persuades, whether by words or actions 
or both, a ininor child under the age of sixteen (16) years to 
either: 
(a) Leave the child's home or school; or 
(b) Enter a vehicle or building; 01. 
(c) Enter a structure or enclosed area, or alley, with the 
intent that the child shall be concealed from public view; 
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while the person is acting without the authority of (i) the 
custodial parent of the child, (ii) the state of Idaho or a political 
subdivision thereof or (iii) one having legal custody of the 
minor child. Nothing contained in this section shall be 
construed to prevent the lawful detention of a minor child or the 
rendering of aid or assistance to a minor child. 
In this case, the district judge ruled that the "intent to conceal" language only modified, 
and was an element of, subsection (l)(c) of the statute. (Tr. p.694, L.22 - p.699, L.20.) 
However, the supreme court addressed this issue in State v. Sindak, 116 Idaho 185,774 P.2d 895 
(1989). Sindak was a case involving a child who was enticed away from a travel trailer parked 
next to a family home and within its curtilage. Thus, the violation alleged was under I.C. $18- 
1509(l)(a), leaving a child's home. Subsection (l)(a) of I.C. 318-1509, like subsection (l)(b) 
with which Harrison was charged, does not specifically have the "intent to conceal a child from 
public view" language written into the section. Sindak challenged the statute as void for 
vagueness and overbreadth. The court determined: 
As noted in the decision of the district court, the statute is not 
overly broad. While the statute forbids one to persuade a minor 
child under sixteen (16) to leave its home or school. or to enter 
buildings, etc, with the intent to conceal the child from public 
view,  levert the less the proscribed act must be done withoul -
proper authority. As discussed in the opinion of the district 
court, permission or authority to do the proscribed acts may be 
expressed or implied and the burden to show otherwise is 
placed on the State. 
w, 116 Idaho 188. (Underlining added, italics in original.) 
While the focus of the court's discussion is on the language "without proper authority," 
the court unquestionably brushes in broad strokes all of the language of I.C. $18-1509(1) in its 
vagueness and overbreadth analysis. The opinion specifically applies the intent-to-conceal 
language to subsections (I)(a) and (b) - (b) being the section Harrison was charged under - and 
specifically avoids delineating the language of subsection (1 j(c) (entering a structure, or eiiclosed 
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area, or alley) which specifically incorporates the intent-to-conceal language. Further, the court's 
analysis is in clear juxtaposition to footnote one, which cites I.C. $ 18-1 509(l)(a)(b) and (c) in its 
entirety. The clear positioning of footnote one immediately below the court's analysis on this 
point makes its meaning unmistakable and its incorporation undeniable. 
The clear import of Sindak cannot be mistaken; not only is I.C. 518-1509 not void for 
vagueness, but the intent to conceal language found in subsection (l)(c) also modifies 
subsections (l)(a) and (b). 
B. Reversible Error. 
The propriety of a jury instruction is a question of law over which the appellate court 
exercises free review. State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 64 P.3d 296 (2002, rehearing denied), 
citing State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 955 P.2d I082 (1998). When reviewing jury instructions, 
the question is whether, when read as a whole and not individually, they fairly and accurately 
reflect the applicable law. Id. To be reversible error an instruction must have mislead the jury or 
prejudiced the complaining party. State v. Lilly, 142 Idaho 70, 122 P.3d 1170 (Ct. App. 2005). 
When reviewing an elements instruction, the United States Supreme Court has held that in a 
criminal trial "the State must prove every element of the offense, and a jury instruction violates 
due process if it fails to give effect to that requirement." State v. C o f h ,  146 Idaho 166, 191 
P.3d 244 (2008), quoting Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 124 S.Ct. 1830, 158 L.Ed.2d, 701 
(2004). 
If this court applies on appeal and finds that intent to coilceal a child from public 
view is an element of I.C. $1 8-1509(1)(b), the next step is to determine whether the failure to so 
instruct the jury oil this element was reversible error. Lillv. s u m .  At the time of sentencing, the 
district judge made a detailed analysis comparing second degree kidnapping, and its element of 
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intent to conceal a child from its parents, to I.C. $18-1509(1)(b), which the judge interpreted to 
have no element of intent to conceal a child from public view: 
The difference between felony kidnapping, which carries 
a maximum 25 years in the penitentiary, and the 
misdemeanor enticing that the jury convicted Mr. 
Harrison of is whether the State has proof of intent to 
keep or conceal the child from the custodial parent. And 
Mr. Christiansen says that I've assumed or I've 
characterized or I've postured what Mr. Harrison's intent 
was. What I did was in the context of looking at this case, 
I analyzed the State's proof to see what the proof of intent 
was. And I want to restate that the only difference 
between 25 years in the penitentiary and a maximum - or 
possible 25 years in the penitentiary and a maximum six 
months in the county jail is that proof of intent to keep or 
conceal the child from the custodial parent. 
So what Mr. Harrison's intent was is open to wide 
speculation, and that's the only reference that I made. I 
never speculated on what Mr. Harrison's intent was, but 
what I did do was prohibit the jury from speculating on 
what his intent was in order to find him guilty. The State 
has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that's an 
element of the offense, it's a critical element of the 
offense in this case, that his intent was to kidnap or lteep 
or conceal the child from the custodial parents, and I 
could not find that element or sufficient proof of that 
element in the evidence. 
So, as far as the evidence showed, the jury was left 
to speculate on whether Mr. Harrison was a lonely man 
wanting somebody to talk to or whether he had perverse 
purposes. As Mr. Cassidy phrases it, is the Court going to 
indulge in the presumption of a sinister purpose or was 
Mr. Harrison going to get Mr. - or get the child behind 
closed doors never to be seen again? No one knows, and 
the evidence doesn't tell us. 
The district court clearly determined that evidence of intent to co~lceal the child from 
either parental or public view was utterly lacking. I-lad the court given ihe instruction on 
enticement of a child with the element of intent to conceal that child from public view it would, 
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at a minimum, have had to have given the advisory instruction to acquit as it had also done on 
the second degree kidnapping charge. See I.C. $19-2123. By giving the jury the advisory 
instruction to acquit with respect to the charge of enticing of children, the court would have been 
prohibiting "the jury from speculating on what [Harrison's] intent was in order to find him 
guilty .... [because the court] could not find that element or sufficient proof of that element in the 
evidence." The trial court therefore committed reversible error by failing to give the intent 
element in the jury instruction on the enticement of children charge. 
Finally, the trial judge must review the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, 
giving full consideration to the jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the 
evidence, and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom; viewed in this light, if the inculpatory 
evidence is so insubstantial as to any essential element that a jury could not help but have 
reasonable doubt, a judgment of acquittal is appropriate under Rule 29. State v. Hugeins, 103 
Idaho 422; 648 P.2d 1135 (Ct. App. 1982); modified on other grouiids, 105 Idaho 43, 665 P.2d 
1053 (1983). 
There is insufficient and insubstantial evidence of intent to conceal the child from public 
view in order to have the conviction stand against Harrison on appeal. I.C.R. 29. Alternatively, 
this court should grant a new trial because the trial court misdirected the jury in a matter of law 
or, alternatively, the verdict is contrary to law or evidence. I.C.R. 34; I.C. $19-2406.5.6. 
11. 
1.C. 818-1509 IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS 
I.C. $18-1509(1) hi ls  to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence of the 
conduct it proscribes and fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. The 
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statute is vague in all its applications and is therefore facially vague and void for vagueness. (Tr. 
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 969 
1'.2d 244 (1998), City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 128 Idaho 219, 912 P.2d 106 (1996). 
The party challenging the statute on constitutional grounds bears the burden of establishing that 
the statute is unconstitutional and must overcome a strong presumption of validity. Olsen v. J. 
A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990). Appellate courts are obligated to seek an 
interpretation of a statute that upholds its constitutionality. State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 696 
P.2d 856 (1985). A statute should not be held void for uncertainty if any practical interpretation 
can be given. City of Lewiston v. Mathewson, 78 Idaho 347,303 P.2d 680 (1956). 
In State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 69 P.3d 126 (2003), the court detailed the void for 
vagueness analysis: 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is premised upon the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. This doctrine requires that a statute defining 
criminal conduct be worded with sufficient clarity and 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct 
is prohibited and that the statute be worded in a manner that 
does not allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
Village of Hoffman  states, Inc. v. Fiioside, 455 U.S. 489, 102 
S.Ct. 1186, 71, L.Ed.2d. 362 (1982). It is a basic principal of 
due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its 
prohibitions are not clearly defined. Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). 
Furthermore, as a matter of due process, no one may be required 
at the peril of loss of liberty to speculate as to the meaning of 
penal statutes. United States v. Smith, 795 F.2d 841; 847 n.4 
(9th Cir. 1986), citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 
453, 59 S.Ct. 618, 619, 83 L.Ed.2d 888> 890 (1939), Smith v. 
United States, cell. denied, 481 lJ.S. 1032, 107 S.Ct. 1964, 95 
L.Ed.2d 535 (1987). This Courl has held that due process 
requires that all "be informed as to what the State commands or 
forbids" and that "men of common intelligence" not be forced to 
guess a1 the nieaning of the criminal law. Stale v. Cobb, 132 
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Idaho 195, 969 P.2d 244 (1998), citing Smith v. Gonuen, 415 
U.S. 566, 574, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1248, 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 612 
(1974). A statute may be void for vagueness if it fails to give 
adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence concerning 
the conduct it proscribes, Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 
1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1984), or if it fails to establislt minimal 
guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must 
enforce the statute. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58, 
103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858-59, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 908-09 (1983); 
v. Larsen, 135 Idaho 754,756,24 P.3d 702, 704 (2001). 
State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 71 1-712. 
A void for vagueness challenge is more favorably acknowledged and a more stringent 
vagueness test will be applied if the statute imposes a criminal penalty. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 
195, 969 P.2d 244 (1998), citing Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 497. In order to be successful in a 
facial vagueness challenge, the complainant must demonstrate that the law is impennissibly 
vague in all of its applications. w, 132 Idaho 199, citing Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 498. If 
the statute does not regulate constitutionally protected conduct, or a significant amount of such 
conduct, the court must inquire whether (a) the statute gives notice to those who are subject to it, 
and (b) whether the statute contains guidelines and imposes sufficient discretion on those who 
must enforce the statute. at 198, citing State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 588, 798 P.2d 43, 47 
With respect to the first test of Bin, I.C. $18-l509(l) provides no notice to individuals 
that they are violating the law. By way of example, there are several scenarios which prove this 
point. 
Assume for the sake of the examples that all of the children in these scenarios are under 
16 years of age. Also assume that I have no intent to hide these children from public view. 
Further assume I am acting without permission fiom the chiidren's parents or other proper 
APPE1,LANT'S OPENING BPJEF - 8 
authorities. Finally, assume that the intent to conceal the children from public view only applies 
to subsection I.C. 5 18-1 509(1)(c). 
Scenario 1: I wallc down the street with my kids to my brother's house to visit. My 
brother and his wife are not home but have gone to a movie. My nephew and niece are home 
and playing video games in the house. I invite them to leave the house and come with me and 
my children down the street to the Dairy Queen for ice cream. I have persuaded them to leave 
their home in violation of I.C. $18-1509(1)(a). 
Scenario 2: I live two blocks from school and have come home froin work early. I 
walk to the school at the end of classes to pick up my third grader. I see my next-door neighbor's 
son and invite him to walk home with us and have thus persuaded him to leave the school in 
violation of I.C. $18-1509(1)(a). 
Scenario 3: 1 am picking my daughter up at the mall as the 7:00 o' clock movie lets 
out. She has met one of her school friends at the theater and I offer to give her a ride home. I am 
in violation of I.C. $18-1509(1)(b), attempting to persuade a child to enter my vehicle. 
Scenario 4: The doorbell rings at my home and I answer it. At the door is a girl who is 
selling Girl Scout cookies. It is cold outside so I invite her inside my house while I go to the 
kitchen to retrieve my checkbook. I am in violation of I.C. 518-1509(1)(b), persuading a child to 
enter a building. 
In none of the four scenarios are individuals of ordinary intelligence given adequate 
notice concerning the conduct which is proscribed. That is, however, unless the proscribed 
conduct occurs with the intent to conceal the children from public view. Further: these are not 
strange scenarios with absurd facts; these are common occurrences that happen countless times 
eve~yday in cities and towns throughout the state of Idaho. Literally thousands of people are it1 
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technical violation of I.C. $18-1509(l)(a) and (b) by attending to the common affairs of their 
daily lives in the rearing of their children and interacting with their young peers. 
With respect to the second test of m, the mere fact that nearly anyone could be found it1 
violation of subsections (l)(a) and (b) leaves unbridled discretion in law enforcement to 
criminally charge individuals at their beck and whim without sui'ficie~lt guidelines and 
appropriate discretion. Further, there is room for additional abuse of discretion when you 
contrast subsections (l)(b) and (c). If a prosecutor charges an individual under section (l)(c) she 
has to prove a defendant had the requisite intent to collceai the child within a "structure." 
Alternatively, if a prosecutor charges an individual under section (l)(b), she has no such 
requirement to prove intent to conceal the child within a "building." This is the epitome of 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
I.C. $18-1509(1) fails both tests for facial vagueness. In actuality, to attempt to apply the 
intent to conceal language, which is clearly drafted solely into subsection (l)(c), into subsections 
(l)(a) and (b), the court would engaging in statutory interpretation that would be strained by any 
standards. I.C. $ 18-1509(1) fails for vagueness 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE the Appellant respectfully prays that the conviction be vacated and the 
case be remanded to the district court with instructions cogsistent herewith. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~ " 7  f ay d, of November, 2008 
THE ROARK LAW FIRM, LLP 
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